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AN OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS

Max Liang and Brian Mansberger
M.S. Students, FrankG. Zarb School ofBusiness, Class of 2014
And
Andrew C. Spieler
ProfessorofFinance, Frank G. Zarb School ofBusiness

ABSTRACT
This article serves as a primer on Social Impact Bonds. A Social Impact Bond is a
new investment product with a framework that serves to finance social benefit programs using
private capital rather than tax revenues, allowing willing investors to take on risk previously
borne by tax payers. The first Social Impact Bond was issued in the U.K. in 2010 and quickly
spread to other countries of which the United States is the most active. This article
summarizes the origin of the product, how the bonds are structured, the participants involved
in bringing the bonds to market, and the benefits of and challenges to their creation.
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INTRODUCTION
The capital markets are filled with investment products that are designed to promote
economic growth and transfer risk to investors who are willing to accept it for a minimum
level of return. Anew type of financial product that was recently developed, the Social
Impact Bond (SIB), represents an innovative and effective way of transferring risk to a larger
audience, while its primary mission is to promote proven social benefit programs. Of
secondary importance is the concomitant economic growth as a positive side effect. Rarely
do you find a type of investment where the central focus is to advance social well-being. The
objective of this article is to offer an overview of SIBs, starting with how the idea originated
in the U.K. and then developed at Peterborough Prison. Next, we explain the general
structure of a SIB by investigating the role of each party involved in its development and
operation. Afterwards, we examine how SIBs are different from traditional bonds, before
moving on to the benefits they provide and the challenges in their development. Finally, we
conclude with a section on the future outlook for this funding source.
A.

ORIGIN OF THE SOCIAL IMPACT BOND

The idea for a SIB, a type of Pay-for-Success contract, was initially conceived by
The Council on Social Action (CoSA), a U.K. think-tank that was organized in 2007, by then
Prime Minister, Gordon Brown (Council on Social Action, 2008). The Council was tasked
with exploring solutions to a number of the UK's most urgent social issues. An issue of
particular importance was the challenge of financing social action programs, with a specific
focus on prevention and early intervention. Typically, governments are solely responsible for
coping with the risks of funding expensive social programs that are expected to realize
savings at some point in the future. Due to poor oversight, these programs, which focus on
issues like reducing the rate of recidivism, decreasing the unemployment rate, and improving
living conditions for the homeless, rarely havetheir intended impact. However, it was
recognized by members of CoSA that when a program does succeed a great deal of capital is
saved in the long run, and at the same time, the conditions of those who were targeted by the
program improved. This raised the question of how to spread an expensive, but successful,
program to a larger audience without requiring the government, and the taxpayers, to take on
the risk of the program not succeeding.
The solution was a funding arrangement known as a Social Impact Bond (SIB) that
provides a way to raise funds from private investors in the capital markets that will be spent
on programs that focus on the prevention and early intervention of costly social problems.
The government then pays investors a return, which is generated from the savings that the
program achieves, that is based on the level of success that the program has achieved. If the
program does not succeed, the investors risk losing a portion, or all, of their investment. The
government and hence taxpayers, are freed from the financial risk of the program failing
while private investors, who are willing to take on that risk, receive a return if the program
succeeds.
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B.

THE FIRST SOCIAL IMPACT BOND

The first SIB was developed in the United Kingdom in 2010 and was the result of a
partnership between the Ministry of Justice and Social Finance UK, a non-profit organization
that creates and implements new models of social change. The funds raised in this SIB are
being used to finance a prisoner rehabilitation program at Peterborough Prison that is
expected to reduce the number of prisoners' that get re-incarcerated (relative to those without
rehabilitation).
The revolving door of crime and prison for many young adults in the Peterborough
area costs the UK government an estimated $214,000 per person in 2002. That amount can
become overwhelming when calculating the costs for over 3,000 short-term prisoners, of
which between 70% - 75% will be re-incarcerated within two years of release (Council on

Social Action, 2008).
In order to reduce the rate of recidivism, Social Finance UK contracted with St.
Giles Trust to provide rehabilitation, education, training, and employment services to 3,000
young adult prisoners who were given sentences of under 12 months (St. Giles Trust, 2014).
Services are provided while the prisoners are incarcerated and for a limited time after their
release. The intention is to prevent former inmates from being re-incarcerated and to help
them become productive members of society. If St. Giles is successful in reducing recidivism
among the Peterborough inmates then over time the UK government will spend less on law
enforcement, courts, and prison stays, and keep and collect more in tax revenues due to
increased property values and economic growth. These funds will then be passed back to the
investors who provided the upfront funding to establish the services provided by St. Giles
Trust.
According to the Ministry of Justice, as of June 2013, preliminary results showed
that the Peterborough bond has been successful in reducing the re-conviction rate by 23%
relative to the comparison group (de Grave, 2013).
C.

STRUCTURE

The general arrangement of all SIBs currently outstanding is similar. The incentives
for the participants must be aligned with the intended outcome. All participants must provide
Investors provide

upfront funding

Public benefits from:
*Lower taxes

*Better services

Government
passes savings
backto investors

Non-profit
providesservices

S
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some level of expertise to ensure that the bond issue and program is carried out successfully.
Figure 1 demonstrates a SIB model.
Investors - The social programs used by service providers, such as a prisoner
rehabilitation program, are funded by private investors. Investors provide the upfront
financing directly to the intermediary organization which then makes payments to the service
provider. Using funds from private investors has the effect of alleviating taxpayers of the
financial risk of the program not succeeding.
The investors have the potential to earn a return if the target outcome of the SIB is
met or they may suffer a loss if the SIB is unsuccessful. For this reason the investor also
plays a role in determining what the objectives of the SIB should be. SIBs are currently only
available to qualified private and institutional investors, similar to hedge funds.
Intermediary - The intermediary is responsible for coordinating participants of the
SIB. The intermediary, along with the government, is instrumental in determining which
social issue will be addressed with the funds that are raised. They are responsible for raising
funds from investors, choosing the service provider(s) and evaluating their performance to
ensure that expectations are met, and managing the cash flows to all participants. They also
play a collaborative role with investors, service providers, and government agencies in
determining what the objective of the SIB should be in order for the investors to receive a
return commensurate with their investment.

*Raisefunds from investors.2n
*Chooseservice provider(s) and
evaluate their performance.
uManage
payments to all parties
with FCollaborate
other participants to
o tne yor quald
objectives
nhow

-Poieufotfnancing for social
benefit programs
* Earn a return if SIBmeets objective
or suffera loss if SIBfall s shorts of
bjectives.

Receive upfront financing from
intermediaryto design and implement
program services to participantsp

Pay investors from savings
generated by successful SIB. If SIBis
not successful then government
not make any payments.

udoes

Figure 1. Social impact bond structure and its participants
Service provider - The delivery of services in the SIB structure may be taken on by
one or many qualified non-profit agencies, which work collaboratively to meet the objectives
set by the intermediary and other participants. A service provider is determined to be
qualified if they meet standards set by a local government agency, usually indicating a history
of proven success. Service providers are of central importance to the SIB meeting its
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objectives and should have expertise in the field for which they are providing services. It is
their responsibility to design and implement the program services to the participants, using
the upfront financing that they receive from the intermediary. The return received by
investors is directly related to the effectiveness of the service providers' intervention. In the
case of the Peterborough Prison bond mentioned above, St. Giles Trust is the provider
running the rehabilitation program that is expected to prevent participants from being reincarcerated (Powell, 2010).
Government - As the participant that is ultimately responsible for covering the cost
of a successful SIB, the government has the final say on which social issue will be addressed
with the bond funds. For bonds whose objectives have been achieved, the government will
realize a financial savings over a period of many years. From those savings, the government
agrees to cover the current cost of the service provider and to pay an agreed upon return to the
investors.
Independent Assessor - An independent assessor is chosen to measure the
effectiveness of program interventions and to provide a final conclusion as to whether or not
predetermined objectives were met. In the Peterborough Prison bond, the Independent
Assessor will determine the rate at which recidivism is reduced.
All of the bonds currently outstanding, or in the planning stage, are focused on early
intervention and prevention. The intent is to be proactive by addressing the root cause of a
problem, rather than the consequence, as this is the most effective way to provide long term
savings. In the past, funding had been spent on ineffective early intervention and prevention
strategies. That ineffective spending, or government waste, caused social issues to worsen
over time. As problems grow, a shift in funding takes place where more resources are needed
to deal with the consequences of those problems rather than the causes. This causes a cycle to
occur in which too much focus is put on the effect, and not enough on the cause, of social
problems. The structure of a SIB includes a level of oversight that eliminates many of the
inefficiencies that would otherwise exist, hence, generating long term savings.
According to Intaglio, a non-profit enterprise that organizes and implements SIB
projects, as of May2014 there were 32 SIBs in the design stage and 8 that have already been
implemented. The table in Appendix A provides detailed information.
D.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TRADITIONAL BONDS AND SIBS

Based on the previous section, you might be wondering if SIBs are bonds at all.
Due to the increasing complexity of bond features and the fact that SIBs are still at an early
stage in their innovation, with attributes changing for each issue, it is difficult to conclude
whether or not the term "bond" is a misnomer. However, looking at the matter from a logical
standpoint can shed some light on the matter.
First, it is necessary to establish that all bonds are considered debt instruments
(Ross, Westerfield and Jordan, 2009). Debt is defined as the obligation of a borrower (debtor)
to repay borrowed amounts to a lender (creditor) according to a pre-determined schedule. If
the borrower is unable to meet its repayment obligations then they are considered to be in
default. In the case of SIBs, since payouts to investors are based on the performance of an
underlying entity (the bonds objectives being achieved) rather than an organizations ability to
repay and because there is no possibility of default, they have more in common with
derivative contracts (or structured notes) than bonds (Sundaram and Das, 2011).
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In terms of risk characteristics, considering that the service providers will have a
proven history of success, SIBs are generally considered to be low risk investments.
Nevertheless, if the service provider does not meet its objective then the potential for a
complete loss of capital exists since there is no collateral securing the investment.
Using the Peterborough Prison case as an example, suppose that St. Giles Trust is
unable to reduce the rate of recidivism by the intended amount. Investors would have no right
to make a claim on assets, regardless of the Ministry of Justices ability to pay. Moreover, the
Ministry of Justice would not be considered to be in default. If, on the other hand, the
maximum reduction in recidivism is achieved then investors will earn a 13% annualized
return, compared to 15.3% that high yield bonds earned in 2010 (Social Finance, 2011). For
comparative purposes, the average yield in 2010 for a 30-year AAA corporate bond, which is
closer to the level of risk found in a SIB, was 4.94% (Federal Reserve Economic Data).
For traditional bonds, risk is largely measured in terms of their credit rating, which
indicates the likelihood that an investor will collect fixed payments owed to them on predetermined dates (Fabozzi and Mann, 2005). The payment amount for SIBs is not fixed, but
rather it falls within a range of payment amounts that depend on the effectiveness of the
service provider's interventions. Determining the likelihood and level of success of a service
provider makes it considerably more difficult to assess risk. While credit rating agencies use
mostly quantitative financial metrics, such as ratio analysis and cash flow predictions, to
determine the probability of a corporation meeting its debt obligations, that same approach
does not fit the SIB structure. Instead, the ratings approach will need to focus on qualitative
factors such as the effectiveness of service providers, oversight provided by the intermediary,
and the difficulty of meeting the SIBs objectives.
Considering that the payment conditions for SIBs are entirely based on the
performance of the service provider, similar to how equity returns are reliant on the
performance of a corporations management team, and that the risk and return profile is not
comparable to that of bonds, it suggests that it may be misleading to refer to them as bonds, or
debt instruments at all.
E.

BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS
A. Benefits of SIBs

1.

Increaseeffectiveness of social intervention

SIBs are considered to be a type of Pay-for-Success contract; a concept that has
existed for some time. The Pay-for-Success concept rewards service providers with long term
contracts for providing more efficient and effective interventions that lead to social change.
Similar in nature to performance-based contracts, private investors receive a return based on
performance objectives being met by service providers. This financial incentive gives
investors a reason to take more of an interest in how effectively a program is run and which
interventions are used. They will require that quality controls be implemented and that
service providers are chosen based on their program model, supervision, and management
team rather than their political ties. The aim of the investor for higher returns and the
requirement that service providers deliver efficient and effect interventions is what drives
further innovation. Consequently, inherent within the model is a strong incentive for all
parties to pursue performance and cost efficiency in achieving the program goals.
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2.

Expandingprograms and reducingfunding risk to service providers

SIBscan help to scale up intervention programs that have a proven record but
currently operate on a small scale. Government agencies are often faced with the issue of
having to fund needed programs with a limited budget. Although the U.S. economy is
strengthening and tax revenues are increasing, the budget for most social services remains
tight. Furthermore, government spending is concentrated heavily on dealing with the
consequences of social issues, such as building prisons and homeless shelters, rather than
dealing with the root cause of those problems. The SIB model provides a solution to this
funding barrier by encouraging private investors to supply the upfront capital needed by
service providers in order to begin their interventions. With more funding sources available
to them, programs can be expanded on a larger scale. This also raises the possibility of
additional savings from increased economies of scale.
Secondly, the model facilitates innovation of social service programs. New
interventions are often less attractive to government agencies because they are unproven and
difficult to implement. This will result in the under provision of social interventions where
they are most needed (similar to the under provision of other public goods). For example,
homelessness, workforce development, recidivism, and healthcare interventions fall into this
group. By using private investors who have a higher willingness to bear risk than government
agencies, SIBs are able to invest in those innovative and promising social intervention
programs. As a result, they encourage the adoption of new solutions and strategies to solve
problems.
3.

Reduce public costs for long term social service expenses

In the long run, SIBs help governments reduce the public costs for social services.
Since the bonds provide the initial funding for prevention and early intervention programs,
which can greatly reduce the need for more costly remediation programs in the future that
would otherwise be bome by the government, a significant savings to taxpayers may be
realized and some budgetary pressure on the government will be alleviated.
For instance, the Peterborough pilot program, currently still in effect, may allow the
U.K. government to achieve a significant cost savings in the Peterborough region. In this
example, cost savings can be achieved when government agencies are able to reduce the cost
to operate a prison and other relative costs associated with lower crime, such as lower court
expenses and a smaller police force. Inspired by the Peterborough pilot, the Riker's Island
Prison SIB was launched jointly by City of New York, Goldman Sachs, Bloomberg
Philanthropies, and MDRC in 2012. According to a press release by then New York City
Mayor, Michael Bloomberg, once the 4 year program concludes, the city of New York may
benefit by realizing a cost savings in the range of $1 million for a 10% recidivism reduction,
to $20.5 million for a 20% reduction (Bloomberg, 2012, Olson and Phillips, 2013).
B. Challenges in developing a SIB
Although there are some significant benefits of SIBs, there are also some inherent
risks with this financing arrangement. The SIB is a complicated, multi-party and cross-sector
financial instrument, which is still in its infancy stage today. In general, challenges involved
in developing a social impact bond can be categorized as follows.
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1.

Is the metric measureable?

The metric used to gauge the success of a SIBmust fulfill two functions: First, it
needs to provide ongoing feedback on interventionprogress. It is imperative that all parties
with a vested interest in the bond succeeding be able to gauge how effective program
interventions are prior to the completion of the program. This will allow any deficiencies to
be corrected and provides a higher chance at the desired outcome.Second, it should be
strongly correlated with the financial benefit that the program expects to achieve. Metrics that
have too weak of a correlation may end up causing investors to be rewarded without any
savings being realized to pay them with. The metric used in the Peterborough case, and in
most prison SIBs, the recidivism rate, is simple to implement, easy to measure using
administrative records, and is closely highly correlated to the benefits that the program
expects to yield. New SIBs thatinvolve thehealthcare or education fieldsare likely to be more
complex and therefore, more difficult to determine which performance metricsto use.
2.

High liquidity riskfor investor

The SIBspayment mechanism allows the government to pay back investors at
maturity based on a performance evaluation.Thus,investors' money will be locked up for a
long time. This means investorsmust be willing to tolerate high liquidity risk since the
duration of a bond is anywhere from 3 to 10 years with no early termination. However,to
appeal to investors with different risk aversions,there are some emerging risk-mitigation
methods that could be applied tothe social impact bond structure,such as reserve funds, firstloss provisions, and other credit enhancingmethods.
3.

Cost more than saving

According to a report issued by the Department of Legislative Services and the
Office of Police Analysis of Maryland "prior experiences with programs for reentry,
including the Peterborough SIB program, have demonstrated that effective pilot programs
cannot finance themselves with cost savings."An independent evaluation conducted by
RAND Europe and authorizedby the U.K. Ministry of Justice found that the Peterborough
prison pilot program could be "too small to deliver substantial 'cashable' savings", compared
to the cost (McKay, 2013).A more cost efficient intervention and a larger treatment
population may be critical for achieving greater cost savings for SIBs. It is more likely
thatlarge scale projectscan bring downthe average cost of intervention andoverhead expenses
through increased economies of scale.
F.

SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS
A. Government support and growth of SIBs

SIBs offer several benefits in addition to transferring risk from federal, state, and
local governments to investors. While the government may ultimately foot the bill when a
social program meets its goals, the payment is made at a future point in time, after the
program has concluded, instead of in the beginning. This delay in payment is an attractive
feature to cash- strapped governments. Additionally, more focus is placed on finding proven
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service providers and methods of change, which allows the maximum value to be achieved
from the program. It is for these reasons that government support has strengthened over the
last few years.
In 2011 the Office of Social Innovation held the first Pay-for-Success gathering
which brought together leaders from non-profit foundations, experts from academia, and
federal, state, and local government officials, to discuss the initiatives behind SIBs.In January
2012, the Departments of Justice and Labor made cleartheir support for SIB pilotprograms by
offering funding competitions, through which qualified applicants that incorporated a Pay-forSuccess model focused on employment and training outcomes were given priority funding.
Additionally, the 2012 and 2013 federal budgets included $100 million for SIB initiatives.
According to the 2014 U.S. Government budget, the Office of Management and Budget
increased the amount of funding for Pay-for-Success initiatives to $500 million, including a
$300 million incentive fund held by the Treasury Department to persuade state and local
governments to push forward SIBpilots.
B. Organizational Support for SIBs
With interest growing rapidly, non-profit agencies and finance organizations are
working with state and local governments to advance their pilot programs and spread the Payfor-Success model. The Harvard Kennedy School SIB Lab is part of an emerging
infrastructure in the U.S. that supports the creation and advancement of SIBs for many state
and city governments. As of May 2014, the Harvard SIB Lab was assisting Colorado,
Connecticut, Maryland, Ohio and 6 other states with research on potential SIB pilots.Social
Finance, Inc., an intermediary within the SIB structure, originated in the UK in 2007, has
assembled branches in the US, Israel, and is looking to extend its reach around the world.
They are playing a key role in bringing together government, investor, and non-profit service
organizations to undertake social challenges in more efficient ways.Furthermore, they provide
educational, advisory, research, advocacy, and analytical servicesto encourage the
development of a sustainable social impact financing market (Social Finance 2014).Goldman
Sachs, which is the most active among large financial institutions in the SIB field, has placed
a primary focus within its Urban Investment Group line of business. It is currently involved
in the development of its third bond, which is set to be issued in 2014 (Goldman Sachs
2014).To meet the needs of investors who seek socially responsible investments, more
financial institutions are becoming involved with SIB programs. In December2013, Merrill
Lynch announced that it had raised $13.5 million in partnership with New York State and
Social Finance, Inc., to finance a new pay-for-success program thatseeks to increase
employment for 2,000 formerly incarcerated residents from New York City and Rochester
(Card, 2013).
G.

THE FUTUREOF SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS
A. More social service areas

Since the first SIB in UK, this innovative financial instrument continues to expand
its service areas. Aside from reducing recidivism, SIBs could use funding forservices in the
education and health care fields.Ideas have been thought of the deal with issues such as
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reducing high school dropout rates,increasing retention for college students, andimproving the
health conditions of childrenand adolescents. For example, In March 2013, the city of
Sacramento launched the first "Health Impact Bond", which will provide asthma intervention
for children in local areas. A preliminary study showed that interventions that focused on
home care and education on asthma will improve a patient's health and allow them to spend
less on treatments(Clay, 2013).In the same year, Goldman Sachs, in cooperation with The
United Way of Salt Lake and philanthropist J.B. Pritzker, announced a SIB that will support
early childhood education programs in Salt Lake City. Cost savings for this bond comes from
successfully reducing the need for expensive special services for children before they enter
elementary school (Goldman Sachs 2014).
Normally, SIBs are used to invest in people-related servicesbut in the future they
could be used to improve city development. In an article written by Dr. John Roman, a Senior
Fellow at the Justice Policy Center at the Urban Institute, he points out that SIBs can provide
an innovative solution to fund the reclamation of blighted areas in cities.Under the bond
model, private investors would fund thoserevitalization projects and cities would pay back
investors from the cost savings ifprofitability from city development projects is confirmed.
B. Risk mitigation of Social Impact Bonds
Because there are inherent financial risks for investorsfromSIBs, to ensure the
performance and payments, these bonds should take advantage of risk mitigation techniques.
Philanthropy guarantee funding is one method currently being used.An example of this is
when Bloomberg Philanthropies provided a $7.2 million guarantee fund for the New York
City SIBin order to reduce risk for the $9.6 million investment fromGoldman Sachs. If the
program does not succeed, the guarantee fund will be used to repay most of Goldman Sachs's
investment. If the target outcomes are met, the city's Department of Corrections will pay
principal plus return back to Goldman Sachs, and the guaranteed funds will be used to
mitigate risk for other SIBs.
Proposals for hybrid models ofSIBshave been put forth to mitigate risk. One
proposal suggests that the government takeon a majority of the risk in a bond from its start,
which necessitatesthe government paying a substantial portion of the program's operating
cost (McKay, 2013). For example, the government would pay 70% of the
programsoperatingcosts and that money will be paid back to the government laterifthe
bondachieves its goals. However, in thisbond model,the return to investors would be lower
since the government is taking on much of the risk.
Another method is to implement a tranche system, similar to mortgage-backed
securities, which would allow investors to carefully choose a tranche that is more conducive
to their risk aversion profile (Social Finance, 2012). For instance, the top (senior)tranche
would primarily be focused on thesmall number of programs that are proven to be effective
and have a strong ability to achieveprogram goals. The risk of failure would be smaller than
other tranches but still exists. This tranche is appealing to investors who prefer a lower risk
investment and are willing to accept a modest return. The middle (mezzanine) tranchewould
include programs that have incomplete or limited evidence of achieving program goals. With
a greater risk of failure, more rigorous and in-depth evaluation would be needed to limit
downside risk for investors, who tend to have a higher return expectation and risk tolerance
level. The lowest and riskiest tranche (first-loss piece)would focus on innovative and
experimental social projects. With the greatest risk of failure and highest potential for return,
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the most likely investors would be philanthropies and foundations, whoare willing to promote
and test innovative interventions and who are not just seeking a financial return.
C. Development Impact Bonds
With growing enthusiasm for social impact bonds in the UK, U.S., Australia, and
other developed countries, SIB conceptsare drawing a growing interest in developing nations
as well. As a variation ofSIBs, Development Impact Bonds (DIBs)will provide a new
sourceto finance infrastructure development and social programs in developing
countries.Similar to SIBs, DIBinvestors will provide private upfront capital to finance social
programs, and only receive principal and return if the program achieves predeterminedgoals.
WithDIBs, a program's implementation quality and cost-effectiveness would bethe primary
concerns rather than the amount of money to be raised. In 2012, the non-profit Instiglio,was
the first organization to investigate the design of a DIB in a developing nation. Instudying the
bond's feasibilitythey must verify whether DIB agencies are able to enter into bond contracts
and provide funding for programs in developing countries (India and Latin America) overthe
local governments.
H.

SUMMARY

The objective of this article is to provide an overview of Social Impact Bonds, a new
investment vehicle that is quickly gaining the attention of the finance, government and
investor communities. SIBs provide a way of funding proven social programs that benefit
society and, at the same time, minimize the amount of taxpayer dollars needed to do so.
Proponents view them as a win-win investment strategy in that all parties benefit under this
financing arrangement. Government organizations, and the communities they serve, receive
services they otherwise cannot afford. Service providers are given the opportunity to spread
established benefit programs to a larger audience with access to a stable source of funds. In
addition, investors have the chance to invest in a socially responsible, low-risk security with
the potential for double digit returns. With new ideas for social benefit projects being thought
of everyday, and funds always in short supply, SIBs will likely have a bright future ahead.
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APPENDIX A

Design

Australia
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Implementation
Design
Design
Design
Design

Australia
Australia
Canada
Colombia
India

New South Wales
New South Wales
Nova Scotia
Medellin
Rajasthan

Design

Israel

Design
Design
Design
Design
Design

Israel
Israel
Mozambique
Pakistan
South Africa

Design
Design
Design
Implementation
Design
Design
Design
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Uganda
Uganda
UK
UK
UK
UK

Design

UK

Implementation
Design

UK
UK

Design
Design
Design
Implementation
Design
Implementation
Design
Design
Design

UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK

Punjab
Cape Town

Peterborough
Essex County
Greater Merseyside
Shoreditch, London
Stratford,
Canning Town,
Royal Docks, Cathall
West
Midlands
(Birmingham)
Nottingham City
Perthshire and
Kinross, Scotland
West London
Cardiff and Newport
Greater Manchester
Thames Valley
London
Wales
Cornwall
Country-wide

intensive
vamily
Support Services
New Parent and Infant
Family Support
Recidivism
Teenage Pregnancy
Education
Workforce development
for ultraorthodox Jews
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